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 Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift 
 
Husserl on Concepts in Perception 
 
Corijn Mattheus Arie van Mazijk 
 
(1) Kant is a category conceptualist, a position motivated by skepticism (Chapter 1) 
 
(2) McDowell’s conceptualism is motivated by a state of oscillation in modern epistemology, and 
by concerns about the relation between reason and nature (Chapter 2) 
 
(3) In Logical Investigations, Husserl does away with Kant’s distinction between sensibility and 
understanding and re-conceptualizes it entirely in terms of synthesis. Epistemic warrant is 
reconsidered in terms of intuitive acts bringing fullness to empty meaning acts (Chapter 3) 
 
(4) Husserl’s account of intentionality in Ideas I involves a commitment to forms of non-
conceptual content shared by some contemporary analytic philosophers (Chapter 4) 
 
(5) Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological epistemology draws on the whole life of 
consciousness, not only its conceptual contents (Chapter 5) 
 
(6) Neither Kant nor McDowell can provide a ‘genesis’ of reason; Husserl’s systematic 
philosophy does allow for such an endeavor (Chapter 6) 
 
(7) Although in genetic phenomenology passive perception is considered the ‘mother soil’ of 
knowledge, Husserl’s later work on habit points to a markedly more holistic understanding of the 
perception-thought relation (Chapter 7) 
 
